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THE REACH OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
IMPLICATIONS ON STATE PROCEDURAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act' was enacted in 19252 to ensure the
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts involving
maritime transactions or interstate commerce.3 Generally, the Act has
encountered few problems in federal courts. However, troubling ques-
tions have arisen concerning the Act's scope, specifically with regard to its
applicability in state courts.4 The Act's procedural provisions, designed to
implement its substantive command, do not explicitly provide for enforce-
ment in state courts.5 The Supreme Court decisions regarding the Act's
procedural requirements have been limited to their applicability in fed-
eral courts.6 It was not until 1984, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,7 that
the United States Supreme Court stated that the Act's substantive provi-
sion applied to the states.' Until Keating, the Court effectively avoided
directly addressing the issue of whether the substantive command of the
Act applied to the states.9 Today, despite the Court's holding in Keating,
the question of whether the Act's procedural provisions apply to the states
still remains unanswered.' °
Despite the Court's holding that the Act's substantive provision is
binding upon state courts, one member of the Court has questioned
whether state courts still have the power to utilize state remedies for
enforcement." Although the Act's main substantive provision is ambigu-
ous with regard to its applicability to state courts, the enforcement provi-
1. Hereinafter referred to interchangeably as the Act or the FAA.
2. Arbitration Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988)).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
4. Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)
(stating that state courts are obliged, as much as federal courts, to grant stays of litigation pending
arbitration) with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 31 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "state courts should nonetheless be allowed.., to fashion their own procedures for enforcing [a
valid arbitration agreement]").
5. The Act's coercive provisions speak only of "courts of the United States" and "United States
district court[s]." 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 & 4 (1988).
6. See infra notes 103-161 and accompanying text. These decisions examine sections 3 and 4 of
the Act, which provide for a stay of litigation pending arbitration and compel a federal district court to
order arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 & 4 (1988).
7. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
8. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).
9. The Court, in an earlier decision, cleared the way for its inevitable holding in Keating by
stating that "the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty."' Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). The import of this statement is its characterization of
the Act as federal substantive law as opposed to federal procedural law.
10. The Supreme Court has partially answered this question, stating that state courts are obliged
to grant stays of litigation under section 3 of the Act. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
11. See Keating, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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sions of the Act appear to apply only to federal courts. 12 The result today
is that state procedural law governing arbitration is of questionable force
when a proceeding is governed by the Act."3 Nevertheless, the United
States Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that state courts must
adhere to the Act's procedural provisions.'
4
The Act's preemptive strength is not absolute. 15 Parties may agree to
displace the procedural mandates of the Act.' 6 The overriding force in
contracts containing arbitration agreements is the parties' agreement
itself, notwithstanding that the contract falls under the Act's purview.
17
How the parties will proceed to arbitration depends upon the parties'
agreement regarding what procedure will govern, and whether this agree-
ment is consistent with the policies underlying the Act. In this sense,
state procedural law that is consistent with the substantive command of
the Act should be allowed to stand as well.' 8
The purpose of this Note is to explore the applicability of the Act's
procedural provisions to state courts. Specifically, this Note will examine
the severability of the Act's substantive and procedural commands.
Assuming the Act's substance can be severed from its procedure, the issue
becomes whether there is any practical distinction between parties' agree-
ments to displace the Act's procedural provisions in favor of state proce-
dural law, which the Supreme Court has upheld, and state procedural law
that stands alone.
First, this Note will explore the Act's key provisions, focusing specifi-
cally on sections 2, 3 and 4.' Section 2 is the Act's main substantive
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4 (1988) (referring to "courts of the United States" and "United States
district court").
13. See, e.g., Woermann Constr. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding as improper Missouri arbitration statute requiring a ten-point capital letter
arbitration notice).
14. The Supreme Court has stated in dicta that state courts are as obliged as federal courts to
grant stays under section 3. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26. However, the
accompanying footnote suggests only that states adhere to the section 3 command granting a stay. Id.
at n.34.
15. The Act does not contain an express preemptive provision. Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
16. See generally id. (upholding a choice of law provision in a contract that incorporated state
procedural law which differed from the Act, based upon the fact that the parties agreed to the
applicable state law in their contract).
17. Id. at 472.
18. The Court has stated that "even when Congress has not completely displaced state
regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. at 477 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
19. Section 1 defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce" and provides narrow exceptions
to the Act. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Sections 5-16, while also of questionable applicability to the states,
do not concern the "pre-arbitration" stage for present purposes. 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16. Sections 201




provision, recognizing the "[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement" of
arbitration agreements involved in commerce and maritime transac-
tions.2° Section 3 requires a stay of a trial pending arbitration.21 Section
4 describes the specific enforcement procedure by which, upon petition, a
United States district court must order arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement. 2
Second, this Note will examine the Act's legislative history.23 The
legislative history behind the Act is ambiguous as to whether it was
intended by Congress to apply in state courts at all. 24 Nothing in the Act's
history clearly indicates whether it was enacted pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause or pursuant to federal control over inferior courts.' The
United States Supreme Court has espoused the former view, thus
enabling it to find that state courts must adhere to the Act's substantive
command. 6
Next, this Note will discuss the Act's substantive hold on the states
and the application of the Act's procedural provisions in general. 7 It was
not until the Keating decision that the Court was squarely confronted
with the issue of whether the Act was binding upon the states.28 Justice
O'Connor's strong dissent in Keating supports the proposition that the
Act's procedural provisions, namely sections 3 and 4, are inapplicable to
the states, notwithstanding the fact that its substantive provision, which
requires recognition of the validity of arbitration agreements, is applica-
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
22. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
24. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (stating that -[a]lthough the legislative
history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something
more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts"). But see id. at 25
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[olne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the
FAA's [with respect to the Act's application to federal courts only]").
25. The legislative history of the FAA does not indicate conclusively from which of its powers
Congress had drawn. For example, the House Report stated that "[tihe purpose of this bill is to make
valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate
commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the
Federal courts." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (emphasis added). The House
Reort also stated that "[tihe bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be
enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement." Id, at 2 (emphasis
supplied). The distinction is central to the Act's applicability to state courts, because the power to
regulate interstate commerce allows Congress to preempt state law in the field in which it is
legislating, whereas if the Act was derived from congressional control over federal court procedure,
the Act would have no application in state courts. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1 (1984).
26. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (stating that
"it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty'" ) (quoting
in part H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11
(1984).
27. See infra notes 60-160 and accompanying text.
28. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).
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ble. 29 Nevertheless, decisions rendered by the Court prior to Keating,
but read today in conjunction with Keating, indicate that the Act's proce-
dural provisions should be followed by the states.30
Finally, this Note will focus on the Act's impact on state arbitration
law.31 No state-federal conflict arises when an agreement to arbitrate falls
outside of section 2.32 The states are free to legislate in this regard. Still,
no practical reason exists for states to enact one provision for agreements
covered by the Act and another provision covering agreements not falling
within the Act's purview. This Note concludes by advocating that states
should stay consistent with the Act to ensure that the federal law gov-
erning substantive enforceability remains intact. States should avoid
enacting procedural rules that frustrate the Act's purpose, which is to
ensure enforceability of arbitration agreements.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Section 2 is the substantive provision of the Federal Arbitration
Act.33 It provides that written provisions calling for arbitration in any
"maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
' 4
When a transaction or contract does not fall within this definition, the Act
will not apply.a However, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Man-
29. Id. at 31 n.20.
30. See infra notes 60-160 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 162-216 and accompanying text.
32. Unless an agreement evidencing a transaction involving commerce or maritime transaction is
involved, section 2 of the Act will not apply. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
34. Id. Section 2 provides in full that
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part ereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
Section 1 defines maritime transactions and commerce:
"Maritime transactions," as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water
carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels,
collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy,
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce," as herein defined, means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another,
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of
Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
35. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956).
1994] NOTE
ufacturing Co., the United States Supreme Court noted that the "com-
merce" requirement is not difficult to fulfill.36 Thus, there are few
instances in which a contract or transaction will not be covered by the Act.
Section 3 of the Act is a procedural provision that requires a court of
the United States to grant, upon motion of a party, a stay of litigation
when the court is satisfied that by the terms of the arbitration clause, the
issue is referable to arbitration.3" Of notable importance in this section is
the language "courts of the United States."38 When read in conjunction
with section 4," the other pre-award procedural provision of the Act,
"courts of the United States" appears to mean federal district courts
rather than state courts. Indeed, a United States Supreme Court Justice
has noted that, even when read outside of the context of the other provi-
sions of the Act, "courts of the United States" is commonly used in refer-
ence to federal courts, 40 Nevertheless, although it has not explicitly held
as such, the Supreme Court has asserted that state courts are bound by
the command of section 3, despite its seemingly federal reference to
"courts of the United States. 41
The specific enforcement remedy in the Act's other pre-award provi-
sion is contained in section 4.42 Like section 3, section 4 is also a proce-
36. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 n.7 (stating that "'[t]he
control over interstate commerce [one of the bases for the legislation] reaches not only the actual
physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts [that merely relate] to interstate commerce' ")
(citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)). Interestingly, the United States Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari on this issue. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d
354 (Ala. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994) (No. 93-1001). The appellants in Dobson
argued that because the Court in Keating held that Congress's regulatory power under the FAA is
coextensive with its commerce power, the Alabama Supreme Court should apply the "slightest nexus"
standard to determine whether the "involving commerce" requirement ha been fulfilfed. Dobson,
628 So. 2d at 355. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, stated that the proper standard is
whether the parties "contemplated substantial interstate activity." Id. The court held that the parties'
activity did not satisfy this standard. Id. at 357.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Section 3 in full provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on applcation of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in
default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Section 4 states in relevant part that "[a] party ... may petition any United States district
court ...." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (emphasis added).
40. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 29-30 n.18 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the change in wording from "courts of the United States" to "United States district court"
was intended by Congress only to be a "clerical change").
41. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)
(stating that "state courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of litigation under
section 3 of the Arbitration Act").
42. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Section 4 provides that
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which,
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dural provision. It allows an aggrieved party to petition "any United
States district court" for an order to compel arbitration in the event that
the "breaching"43 party neglects, refuses, or fails to arbitrate.44 Like sec-
tion 3, there is a strong indication that Congress intended section 4 to
apply solely to federal courts, as evidenced by the words "United States
district court.
45
III. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The Federal Arbitration Act was promulgated in response to the hos-
tility courts had shown towards arbitration agreements. 46  American
courts had previously followed the English common law principle, which
allowed a party to revoke an arbitration agreement prior to an award
being issued.4' Thus, at that time, an aggrieved party was without an ade-
quate remedy. However, in 1924, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the New York arbitration law, which was enacted in 1920.48 Fol-
lowing the Court's approval of the New York Law, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act, thereby abrogating the common law approach.49
The authority of Congress to enact such a law was considered
"ample," and unfortunately, discussion regarding such authority was lim-
ited.50  Herein lies the crux of the pre-Keating debate over Congress's
authority for passing the Act: whether the Act grew out of congressional
save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in
admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties or an order drectngtat such abitrton proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.... The court shall hear theparties and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.
Id.
43. The term "breaching" refers to the arbitration clause itself and not necessarily to the
contract as a whole.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
45. id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). The House Report stated that "[t]he
need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law.... [Blecause of the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate
upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction." Id. This principle of
nonenforcement was adopted by the American courts. Id.
47. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The Senate Report cited several reasons for
the common law rule. One reason was that courts did not feel that arbitration tribunals possessed the
means to give relief. Id. Another was the fear that these tribunals lacked the element of justice. Id.
Perhaps the most significant reason for the lack of enforceability was that the courts feared they
woulf be "ousted from their jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
48. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1924) (upholding the
Arbitration Law of New York).
49. See supra note 2; see also H.R. REP. No. 96,68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) and S. REP. No.
536, 68th Cong.,- 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
50. Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Committees on the
Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1924).
464
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authority to control inferior federal courts, or whether it was based upon
congressional power over interstate commerce.51 If Congress had relied
solely on the former, the Act's substantive provision 52 would only be
applicable in federal courts.' On the other hand, if the sole basis of the
Act was derived from congressional power over interstate commerce, then
the Act's substantive applicability to the states would be difficult to
dispute.54
The issue of congressional authority impacts the procedural question
because if the "maritime transactions" or "interstate commerce" require-
ments contained in the section 2 substantive provision are not met, then
the other procedural provisions will not apply. 5  In light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating,56 the basis of congres-
sional authority for the Act is no longer at issue.57 However, there is an
inconsistency between the plain language of the Act and its legislative
history that bears on the current procedural issue. First, nothing in the
Act's legislative history suggests an intention to bifurcate its substantive
and procedural provisions.58 Second, the procedural sections of the Act
still appear to refer to federal courts.59 The following discussion outlines
Rep. Dyer: "There is no question of the authority of Congress to legislate on this subject
as provided in the bill, is there?"




51. Congressional power to regulate commerce is derived from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of
the United States Constitution. Congressional power to establish inferior federal courts is derived
from Article III. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 405 (1967) (holding that the Act is "based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty'") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess 3 (1924)).
52. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2 provides in relevant part that "[a] written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... "
53. If the Act was derived from congressional power to control federal courts, the Act would be
procedural in nature. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 418 (Black, J.,
dissenting). "So far as congressional acts relate to the procedure in such courts, they are clearly
within the congressional power. This principle is so evident and so firmly established that it cannot be
seriously disputed." Julius Henr Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 275 (1926) (Julius Cohen participated in the Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R.
646).
54. For a discussion of the significance of this distinction, see supra note 25 and accompanying
text. In Keating, the Court stated that if Congress had intended to enact a procedural rule which was
applicable only in federal court, "it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving commerce."
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
55. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
56. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
57. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (holding that "[tihe Federal Arbitration
Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause"),
58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The House Report states that
"[theproposed Act] declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and
provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement." Id.
59. Section 3 refers to "courts of the United States." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Section 4 refers to
"any United States district court." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
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the effect of the Act's substantive command on the state courts and the
difficulties that have ensued regarding the application of the Act's proce-
dural provisions to the states.
IV. SECTION 2 AND ITS BINDING EFFECT ON THE STATES
A. THE SECTION 2 REQUIREMENT
As noted earlier, the substantive command in section 2 of the Act
provides, without reference to federal or state courts, that arbitration
agreements contained in maritime contracts and contacts involving inter-
state commerce are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."6 Without a
contract or transaction first satisfying section 2, the procedural sections of
the Act do not apply.
61
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ,62 the Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 3, which requires a stay of litigation pending arbitration, is inapplica-
ble when the contract or transaction did not otherwise satisfy section 2.'
The Court asserted that although "section 3 does not repeat the words
'maritime transaction'" as found in section 2, the "'agreement in writing'
for arbitration referred to in section 3 is the kind of agreement which
sections 1 and 2 have brought under federal regulation."64 The Court
found that the section 2 commerce or admiralty requirements must first
be satisfied before the section 3 stay requirement applies.
6
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Bernhardt decision was
the hesitation of the Court to address whether "arbitration touched on
substantive rights, . . . or was a mere form of procedure within the power
of the federal courts or Congress to prescribe."66 Since the transaction at
issue did not satisfy section 2 of the Act, the Court avoided the issue by
reading section 3 narrowly.67 Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.68 characterized the tight dilemma
that Justice Medina would have faced in Bernhardt had the transaction
satisfied section 2:69
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
61. See generally Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
62. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
63. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id. at 202.
66. Id.
67. Id. A significant factor in Bernhardt was that Vermont law recognized the revocability of
arbitration agreements at any time prior to award. Id. at 199-200. This factor, combined with the
absence of a transaction satisfying section 2, precluded a determination that section 3 was indeed
binding by its own force. Id. at 201.
68. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
69. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967).
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If [Justice Medina] held that the Arbitration Act rested
solely on Congress' power, widely recognized in 1925 but
negated in Erie, to prescribe general federal law applicable in
diversity cases, he would be compelled to hold the Act unconsti-
tutional as applied to diversity cases under Erie and Bernhardt.
If he held that the Act rested on Congress' power to enact sub-
stantive law governing interstate commerce, then the Erie-Bern-
hardt problem would be avoided and the application of the Act
to diversity cases involving commerce would be saved.70
Consequently, the question regarding the Act's derivation was not
resolved in Bernhardt since its resolution was not imperative to the out-
come of the case.71
B. THE KEATING DECISION
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,72 the United States Supreme Court
stated that the section 2 substantive requirement of the Act is binding
upon state courts.73 At issue in Keating was whether a provision of the
California Franchise Investment Law invalidated the parties' agreement
to arbitrate their disputes.7 ' The California court construed the law to
require judicial resolution of franchise-related claims and held that the
arbitration agreement between the parties in their contract was invalid,
despite the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act.7 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that the California statute vio-
lated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because of
its direct conflict with section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
7 6
70. Id. at 417.
71. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
72. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
73. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984). The dispute in Keating was between
the appellant Southland, who was the franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores, and the appellees,
who were approximately 800 franchisees. Id. at 3-4. Southland Corp.'s standard franchise agreement
contained a clause requiring arbitration of any controversies or claims. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 3. The California statute provided in relevant part that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any
provision of [the California Franchise Investment Law] is void." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West
1977). See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982).
75. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d at 1203-04.
76. Keating, 465 U.S. at 10. The Court was unpersuaded by the California Supreme Court's
analogy to Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, the United States Supreme Court held that
the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act of 1933 overrides arbitration agreements incorporating
securities claims. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides that "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding an person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of this subchapter.., shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1988). The Court found
that there exists a strong federal policy favoring enforcement of securities laws. Wilko, 346 U.S. at
431. Consequently, the Court in Wilko held that the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act
operated as an exception to the FAA. Id. at 435.
The Keating Court found the California Supreme Court's analogy to Wilko flawed because
Keating involved a state-created right, whereas the statute in Wilko was federal. Keating, 465 U.S. at
16 n.11.
1994] NOTE
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The Court stated that "the 'involving commerce' requirement in
[section] 2 [is not] an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal
courts, but.., a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in
state and federal courts. 77 The Keating decision thus explicitly adopted
the notion that the Act is a substantive statute derived from the Com-
merce Clause.78  Nevertheless, the majority in Keating stated that
although state law is preempted to the extent that it undercuts enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements, "we do not hold that sections 3 and 4 of
the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts."79
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, asserted that the majority's inter-
pretation of section 2 was directly contrary to the structure of the Act.8 0
Although her view of the Act has been criticized as overbroad,"' it may, in
fact, be a more accurate characterization. Relying on the legislative his-
tory of the Act, she found that "[s]ection 2, like the rest of the FAA,
should have no application whatsoever in state courts."82  Justice
O'Connor's position was that it is not necessary to hold that section 2 is
binding on the states in order for a party to have its rights vindicated.83
She argued that if the transaction falls within the commerce or admiralty
requirement, thus bringing the arbitration provision within the Act's pur-
view, the aggrieved party is protected by the Act if the usual diversity
requirements have been met.8" Justice O'Connor concluded that when a
suit is premised upon diversity of citizenship in a state court, parties gain
no forum shopping advantages because there is either no access to federal
court in incomplete diversity cases or equal access to all when there is
complete diversity of citizenship.s Furthermore, if a party seeks to avoid
the Act by initiating suit in state court, the aggrieved party can secure an
order from a federal court compelling arbitration.
8 6
77. Id. at 14-15. The Court refused to endorse forum shopping, stating that "[w]e are unwilling
to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce
Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its
enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted." Id. at 15.
78. Id. at 11. An earlier decision by the Court helped pave the way for the Court's ultimate
decision in Keating by concluding "that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to
the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.'"
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
79. Keating, 465 U.S. at 16 n.10.
80. Id. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61, 83 (1985).
82. Keating, 465 U.S. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She went on to state that "[aissuming, to
the contrary, that [section] 2 does create a federal right that the state courts must enforce, state courts
should nonetheless be allowed, at least in the first instance, to fashion their own procedures for
enforcing the right." Id.
83. Id. at 33-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the
alleged failure ... of another to arbitrate... may petition any United States district court ... for an
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The Keating decision has given rise to concerns regarding the power
of the states to enforce their rules of procedure when a transaction or
contract is governed by section 2.87 The most difficult issue, not yet con-
fronted squarely by the Supreme Court, 88 is whether the applicability of
the Act's substantive provision to state courts means that the procedural
provisions also apply.89 The key to the analysis of this problem begins
with an understanding of the Erie doctrine, which helps define the limits
of federal control over state court autonomy.
C. THE ERIE DOCTRINE
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins9" the United States Supreme Court
held that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law
of the state in which it sits.91 The Court stated that "Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state
.... This holding in Erie was extended seven years later in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 93 in which the Court explained that "[t]he nub of the
policy that underlies Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction.., a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead
of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result."'
The Act's applicability to state courts appears to be somewhat of a
reverse Erie" problem. 5 Erie requires that federal courts apply the sub-
stantive law of the state in diversity suits.96 Here, the issue is whether
federal procedural law should displace state procedural law when a pro-
ceeding is initiated in state court. The problem occurs because the Act's
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
87. Keating, 465 U.S. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing, for example, that some state
courts may choose to award punitive damages for the violation of section 2).
88. The Court has not been called upon to resolve this issue. The closest it has come to
addressing this issue was in Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). The Court
in Volt he d that a choice of law provision, in which the parties agreed to have "the law of the place
where the project is located," was valid despite the difference in state procedure. Id. at 472.
However, this holding seems to be based upon the fact that the parties agreedto the provision, rather
than because the state law itself required it. Id. at 477-78.
89. At least two state court decisions have held that when a contract is governed by section 2 of
the Act, sections 3 and 4 also apply. See OAF Corp. v. Werner, 485 N.E.2d 977 (N.Y. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986); Caltney v. Underwood Neuhaus & Co., 700 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985).
90. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
91. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. Id. at 78.
93. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
94. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
95. See generally Warren E. Johnson, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts:
Converse Erie Problems, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 623 (1970).
96. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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procedural law is so intertwined with its substantive law.9 7  However,
determining whether states may apply their own procedural law when
federal substantive law controls depends not simply on whether the suit's
outcome will be different, but whether the federal law's policy will be
upheld. 98
When the Act is viewed in light of Erie and its progeny, it becomes
evident that state procedural law should be preempted to the extent that
it frustrates congressional policy, as well as when the possible outcome
may differ under state law.99 Federal preemption generally occurs when
state law stands in the way of congressional objectives.10 Hence, when-
ever state procedural or substantive law interferes with the enforceability
of valid arbitration agreements governed by the Act, the state law should
be preempted.'O° The preemption of state law should occur as a result of
the Supreme Court's holding in Keating that "Congress intended to fore-
close state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements.' °2
V. THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 3 AND 4
A. CONCURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court's dicta in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp."13  drastically limited state legislative
attempts to undercut the stay requirement in section 3 of the Act. The
Court, by implication, stated that section 3 of the Act is binding upon
state courts.14
In Moses H. Cone, the Court was called upon to determine whether
a federal district court should stay litigation pending the resolution of the
same issue of arbitrability in state court. 0 5 The Court stated that section
97. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress was not only concerned with
upholding the validity of arbitration agreements, but was equally concerned about enforcing these
agreements, albeit in federal courts. H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
98. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (weighing
federal policy favoring jury decisions with state interest in uniformity).
99. Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
473, 532 (1990).
100. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
101. It seems unlikely that the Court can reasonably hold that the procedural provisions are
directly binding upon state courts because the language of these provisions precludes such a holding.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4 (1988). The Court's only reasonable approach to this dilemma appears to be
to emphasize the federal policy that favors arbitration agreements. See Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recognizing the congressional policy favoring
arbitration agreements).
102. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
103. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
104. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
105. Id. at 4.
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2 creates "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."
10 6
The significant aspect of the Moses H. Cone decision was the Court's
expansion of the stay requirement to state courts. The Supreme Court
stated in dictum that "state courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged
to grant stays of litigation under [section] 3 of the Arbitration Act.'
10 7
The Court appears to have decided that the Act's section 3 procedural
requirement for a stay of litigation affects states at least in principle, if not
by its literal command.'0s However, the Court was more reticent when
addressing section 4, which allows a party to secure an order compelling
arbitration, noting that the language of that provision "speaks only of a
petition to 'any United States district court.'"1o9 The willingness of the
Court to expand the reading of section 4 was nevertheless evident." 0
B. BIFURCATION OF ARBITRABLE AND NONARBITRABLE ISSUES
Section 4 of the Act provides that "the [district] court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement.""' Therefore, the terms of the Act do not
give the court discretion to deny an order for arbitration." 2 This results
in separate proceedings when arbitrable and nonarbitrable issues are
pleaded in the same complaint."
3
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd" 4 an investor, Byrd, filed suit
against Dean Witter Reynolds alleging violations of federal securities law
and state law."' When Byrd had invested his funds with Dean Witter, he
signed a Customer's Agreement providing that any controversy arising out
of the contract was to be settled by arbitration." 6 The suit was originally
brought in a United States District Court based on federal question juris-
diction." 7 The issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was
106. Id. at 24. The Court stated further that "[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a
liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary." Id.
107. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26.
108. The reference to state courts was dicta and therefore had no bearing on the merits of the
case.
109. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.35.
110. Id. (recognizing that "at least one state court has held that [section] 4 does require state
courts to issue [section] 4 orders to arbitrate where the section's conditions are met"). Id. (citing
Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-81 (1977)).
111. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (emphasis added).
112. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
113. Id. at 217.
114. Id. at 213.
115. Id. at 214. Since Dean Witter assumed that the federal securities claim was not arbitrable,
it sought only to compel arbitration of the state law claim. Id. at 215.
116. Id. at 215.
117. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214.
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whether, in light of section 4 of the Act,"" a federal district court may
deny a motion to compel arbitration of a pendant state law claim when
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim.119
In resolving the issue, the Court in Byrd compared the conflicting
views of the circuit courts.'2 One approach, espoused by the ninth, fifth,
and eleventh circuits, was the "doctrine of intertwining."12' This doctrine
allows the district court discretion to deny arbitration of the arbitrable
claims and try all claims together when arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims arise out of the same transaction and are factually and legally inter-
twined.12 2 The contrasting bifurcation approach, taken by the sixth, sev-
enth, and eighth circuits, asserts that the Act divests the district courts of
any discretion to deny arbitration and that the courts must order arbitra-
tion of the arbitrable claim when asked to do so.
12 3
In Byrd, the Supreme Court adopted the latter view, acknowledging
the fact that bifurcated proceedings may result in undermining judicial
economy.' 24 The Court looked to the legislative history of the Act and
reasoned that the main purpose behind the Act's passage was to ensure
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements, not to assure expeditious
resolution of disputes as suggested by the respondent."z
C. FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,126 the
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a federal court should
resolve a claim of fraud in the inducement of an entire contract or
whether this claim should be referred to arbitration. 27 The applicable
provision of the Act in the case was section 4.128
In Prima Paint, the petitioner, Prima Paint, originally filed a com-
plaint in federal district court seeking rescission of its contract with Flood
& Conklin on the basis of fraudulent inducement.129 At the same time,
Prima Paint sought an order from the court to enjoin Flood & Conklin
from proceeding to arbitration.' 30 Flood & Conklin then cross-moved to
118. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Section 4 states that when a party is aggrieved by another's failure to
arbitrate, the court shall, upon proper petition, order the parties to proceed to arbitration. Id.
119. B rd, 470 U.S. at 214.
120. 1Y at 216-17.
121. Id. at 216.
122. Id. at 216-17.
123. Id. at 217.
124. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
125. Id. at 219.
126. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
127. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967).
128. Id. at 403. For the text of section 4, see supra note 41.
129. Id. at 398.
130. Id. at 399.
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stay the litigation.' 3 ' The district court granted Flood & Conklin's motion
to stay litigation and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Prima
Paint's appeal.
132
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "arbitra-
tion clauses as a matter of federal law are 'separable' from the contract in
which they are" contained and that, when a fraud claim is directed at the
entire contract containing a broad arbitration clause, the fraud claim is
arbitrable."a The First Circuit's view, on the other hand, was that "the
question of 'severability' is one of state law, and that [when] a State
regards such a clause as inseparable a claim of fraud in the inducement
must be decided by the court."'3
The United States Supreme Court looked to section 4 of the Act:las
Under section 4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts save for the existence of an arbitration
clause, the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to pro-
ceed once it is satisfied that "the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agree-
ment] is not in issue. 136 Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes
to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal
court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in
the inducement of the contract generally.'
3
1
The Court then briefly addressed the constitutional basis of its hold-
ing.las It relied upon the distinction between substance and procedure
set forth in Erie. 39 Since section 4 of the Act is a procedural provision
and the action was brought in federal court, 140 the Court stated that such
a rule of "separability" is constitutionally permissible.' 4 1 The Court stated
that the question "is not whether Congress may fashion federal substan-
tive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases . . . [but
131. Id.
132. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 399.
133. Id. at 402.
134. Id. at 403.
135. Id.
136. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
137. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403.
138. Id. at 404.
139. Id. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating that the distinction
between substance and procedure hinges on whether the matter is "outcome determinative").
140. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
141. Id. at 407. Justice Black criticized the majority for elevating arbitration clauses above other
contractual provisions. Id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting). He asserted that "[u]nder [the majority's]
new formulation, section 2 now makes arbitration agreements enforceable, 'save upon such grounds
that exist at federal law for the revocation of any contract.'" Id. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting).
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rather,] whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to con-
duct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress
plainly has power to legislate. 142
Nothing in section 4 requires the separability of the arbitration
clause from the contract. It merely requires the court to order arbitration
once the arbitration clause is no longer at issue.143 Nevertheless, Prima
Paint's rule of "separability" is consistent with the substantive require-
ment of enforceability of arbitration agreements because the opportunity
for an arbitrable forum should not be lost merely because a party pleads
fraud. 144
D. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES
Often, parties to a contract incorporate a provision stating that a cer-
tain state's laws will apply to the contract. Parties are generally allowed
great freedom in this regard.'4 The decision to choose a particular state's
laws may affect how a subsequent dispute will be resolved.
Section 4 of the Act requires that federal district courts "make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement."'146 This language gives the parties some lati-
tude to determine which state's arbitration law will apply.147  Neverthe-
less, section 4 does not appear to provide a vehicle by which either of the
parties may avoid arbitration entirely.14  To do so would frustrate the
original intent of the parties, which was to submit their disputes to
arbitration.
In a recent case, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trust-
ees,149 the Supreme Court faced a novel issue: whether a choice of law
provision in a contract selecting state law can displace the procedural pro-
142. Id. at 405.
143. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). The provision states that "[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon
being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration .... Id.
144. It is conceivable that a party might plead fraud in the inducement as a means to avoid
arbitration of its claims. See, e.g., Fouquette v. First Am. Nat'l See., Inc., 464 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that parties will have their claims resolved in a judicial forum when a party seeks
rescission of the contract based upon allegations of fraud).
145. ROCEn C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 102 n.2 (5th ed. 1993).
146. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 42.
147. "Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
148. The author's attempts to uncover a Supreme Court decision in which the parties have
agreed to arbitrate disputes, while providing within the contract an alternative remedy in the event
one party fails to arbitrate, have been unsuccessful. Nor does it appear that the Court has addressed
what the result might be if the parties to an arbitration agreement chose a particular state's laws to
govern and that law provided a remedy which could not be characterized as a specific enforcement
remedy (i.e., damages or litigation costs).
149. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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visions of the Act.' 5 ° The suit in Volt was brought in the California Supe-
rior Court.15 1 The parties had agreed in their choice of law clause that
the contract would be "'governed by the law of the place where the Pro-
ject is located.' "152 California was the location, and its law provided that
a stay of arbitration may be granted "pending resolution of related litiga-
tion between a party to the arbitration agreement and third parties not
bound by it."'5 3 The Court looked to the applicable language of section 4
of the Act, which requires the court to direct arbitration to proceed by the
terms of the parties' agreement.14 As such, because the parties in effect
agreed to be bound by California law, the Court held that the choice of
law clause was not preempted by section 4 of the Act.
15 5
The Court seemed to imply that the intent of the parties may over-
ride the Act's procedural provisions. It stated that
because "[t]he thrust of the [Act] . . . is strictly a matter of con-
tract," the parties to an arbitration agreement should be "at lib-
erty to choose the terms under which they will arbitrate."
[When], as here, the parties have chosen in their agreement to
abide by the state rules of arbitration, application of the FAA to
prevent enforcement of those rules would actually be "inimical
to the policies underlying state and federal arbitration law,"
because it would "force the parties to arbitrate in a manner con-
trary to their agreement.'
' 56
Significantly, the Court pointed out that "[section] 4 [order compel-
ling arbitration requirement] of the FAA does not confer a right to com-
pel arbitration of any dispute at any time." 157 It was noted that "the FAA
contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congres-
sional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration."' 58 Perhaps even
more significantly, the Court stated that "we have never held that [sec-
150. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
151. Id. at 470-71.
152. Id. at 470 (quoting the construction contract at issue).
153. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982), construed in Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.
154. Volt, 489 U.S. at 475. Section 4 states in relevant part that "the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement." 9
U.S.C. 4 (1988).
155. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
156. Id. at 472 (quoting the California Court of Appeals). The majority simply read the "law of
the place" language as an intention by the parties to have California law apply because California was
where the project was located. Id. at 470. Justice Brennan took the analysis one step further by
asserting that for purposes of arbitration, the parties did not know what law would a pply. Thus, the
parties did not necessarily choose California law. Id. at 480 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 474.
158. Id. at 477.
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tions] 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in
federal court, are nonetheless applicable in state court." 59
It is uncertain how strictly parties' choice of law clauses will be con-
strued. If parties agree on state law that undermines enforceability of the
arbitration clause, the Act will preempt that state's applicable law by vir-
tue of section 2.1' As Justice Brennan asserted in his dissent, "[w]ere
every state to construe such clauses as an expression of the parties' intent
to exclude the application of federal law.... the result would be to render
the Federal Arbitration Act a virtual nullity as to presently existing con-
tracts."16' The effect of the Volt decision thus renders enforceable choice
of law clauses dictating which procedure will govern.
VI. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND STATE LAW
The current status of the Act with respect to state courts is as follows:
(1) the provisions of the Act are inapplicable in any proceeding unless the
contract or transaction at issue is governed by section 2 of the Act;'16 (2)
states are bound by the substantive command of section 2 of the Act,
which provides that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract;"'3 and (3) state law which undermines the
substantive command of section 2 is invalid.'6
The applicability of the Act's pre-award procedural provisions upon
state courts is uncertain. State courts appear to be generally bound by the
command of section 3 to grant a stay of litigation pending arbitration.'
The federal requirement of adherence by state courts to section 4, how-
ever, is even less clear.' 66 The Court held in Volt that the parties' choice
of law provision will govern, but it did not address state law procedure
that, standing alone, is consistent with the Act.' 67
One commentator asserts that the proper resolution is for courts to
uphold state procedural rules as long as they do not conflict with the sub-
159. Id. at 477 n.6. The Court further stated that "we need not resolve it to decide this case, for
we conclude that even if [sections] 3 and 4 of the FAA are fully applicable in state-court proceedings,
they do not prevent application of CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE ANN. [section] 1281.2(c) .... " Id. at 477.
160. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
161. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 491 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
162. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
163. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
164. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
165. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983).
166. Id
167. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474-76 (1989). The Volt Court
only stated that "[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make state rules governing the conduct of
arbitration-rules which are manifestl designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process-simply
does not offend... Moses Cone's [re of liberal construction]." Id. at 475-76.
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stantive command of section 2."6 Justice O'Connor espoused this view as
well in Keating:.69
[W]e should at a minimum allow state courts and legislatures a
chance to develop their own methods for enforcing the new fed-
eral rights. Some might choose to award compensatory or puni-
tive damages for the violation of an arbitration agreement; some
might award litigation costs to the party who remained willing to
arbitrate; some might affirm the "validity and enforceability" of
arbitration agreements in other ways. Any of these approaches
could vindicate [section] 2 rights in a manner fully consonant
with the language and background of that provision.
170
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it does not recog-
nize the importance of the actual end result-specific enforcement-
which ensures that valid arbitration agreements lead to arbitration. 7'
This seems to have been one premise behind the Act, despite the fact that
Congress chose to have this explicitly stated in the enforcement provisions
of sections 3 and 4 and not in section 2.172 Section 2 on its face declares
only that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable
absent contractual grounds for revocation.'17 Nevertheless, the overall
structure of the Act is geared toward specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 174
A. STATE ARBITRATION LAW
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Keating,
state courts have recognized that they are bound by the Act's substantive
168. Atwood, supra note 81, at 64.
169. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 31 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor stated: "Assuming... that [section] 2 does create a federal right that the state courts must
enforce, state courts should nonetheless be allowed, at least in the first instance, to fashion their own
procedures for enforcing the right." Id.
170. Id. at 31-32.
171. The assurance that the parties' arbitration agreements will be specifically enforced is a
reflection of the federal policy underlying the entire Act, not an assurance derived from section 2
itself. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) This policy has resulted in part from the
developments in the law prior to Keating. Cf. Keating, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (recognizing that intervening developments in the law compelled his
concurring opinion).
172. "The bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and
provides a procedure in the [flederal courts for their enforcement." H. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1924).
173. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
174. The House Report exemplifies the fact that section 2 cannot sufficiently ensure
enforcement of arbitration agreements on its own. Among the objectives of the Act was to ensure
arbitration: "If one party is recalcitrant he can no longer escape his agreement, but his rights are
amply protected. At the same time the party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not
subject to the delay and cost of litigation." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
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provision. 7 5 The majority of states have thus adopted the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act (UAA). As of 1991, 35 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted the UAA in varying forms."' The UAA in its barest form
differs little from the Federal Arbitration Act.177 Its widespread enact-
ment indicates that substantive enforceability is no longer disputed. As
such, those states which have adopted the UAA or similar law will not be
substantially affected by the Federal Arbitration Act. North Dakota, for
example, previously recognized specific enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments only with regard to existing controversies.178 Since Keating, North
Dakota has adopted the UAA, thereby recognizing the enforcement of
prospective controversies.179
B. STATE COURT DECISIONS
1. Fraud in the Inducement
The United States Supreme Court has held that when a party asserts
a claim of fraud in the inducement of an entire contract (and not specifi-
cally fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause), the issue must be
175. See, e.g., Fairview Cemetery Ass'n v. Eckberg, 385 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Minn. 1986); Allison
v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 381-82 (Wash. 1979); Ex Parte Shamrock Food Serv., Inc., 514
So. 2d 921, 922 (Ala. 1987).
176. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 to 09.43.180 (1983); Affz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to 12-
1518 (1982 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to 16-108-224 (Michie 1987 & Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (1987 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
9 5701 to 5725 (1974 & Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to 16-4319 (1989); FLA. STAT.
9 682.01 to 682.22 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to 7-922 (1990 & Supp. 1993);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 710, para. 5/1 to 5/23 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to 34-4-2-
22 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1 to 679A.19 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (1991 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045 to 417.240
(Michie 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§ 5927 to 5949 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1989 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251,
§I Ito 22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5001 to 600.5035 (West 1987
& Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08 to 572.30 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 435.350 to 435.470 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.015 to 38.205
(Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to 44-7-22 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-20 (Michie - & Supp.
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801 to 818 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7301 to 7320 (1982 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to 15-48-240 (Law Co-op Supp.
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (1987 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 29-5-320 (Supp. 1993); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. arts. 224 to 238-6 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to 78-31a-18 (Michie 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 5651 to 5681 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to 8.01-581.016 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1993); Wyo. STAT. §31-36-101 to 1-36-119 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
177. For example, the state of North Dakota has adopted the UAA. Its analogy to section 2 of
the Act dispenses with the unnecessary requirements of admiralty or interstate commerce (because if
these requirements are present in a contract or transaction, the Act will govern). It further dispenses
with the employee exemptions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-01 (Supp. 1991).
178. Atwood, supra note 81, at 72 n.71 (1985) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29-01(1) (Supp.
1983)).
179. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-01 (Supp. 1991).
1994] NOTE
resolved through arbitration. 180  At least two state courts have followed
this course."'
One state court, however, has held the opposite. 18 2 In Fouquette v.
First American National Securities, Inc.," the Minnesota Court of
Appeals stated that the Act does not preempt state procedural law with
regard to severability of an arbitration clause from the contract itself,
despite the United States Supreme Court declaration in Prima Paint.1
84
The Minnesota Court of Appeals framed the issue:
Does federal law, which allows arbitration clauses to be severed
from the entire contract, conflict with state law, which does not
allow arbitration clauses to be severed, as to an arbitration
clause in a customer securities agreement which applies to any
controversy "unless unenforceable due to federal or state
law?"' 85
The Minnesota court concluded that pursuant to Minnesota law, the
party's fraudulent inducement claim, whether or not pertaining to the
arbitration clause itself, was not severable from the entire contract.'
86
Thus, in Minnesota, because allegations of fraud in the inducement
render the entire contract nonarbitrable, it seems likely that a party seek-
ing to avoid an arbitration clause in its contract would only need to plead
fraud in the inducement of the contract.18  The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota has expressed this concern and thus requires allegations of fraud to
be pleaded with particularity in order to avoid this result.' 88
180. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1967).
181. See, e.g., Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751, 754-55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973);
Konewko v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 528 N.E.2d 1 (I11. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d
915 (1989).
182. See Fouquette v. First Am. Nat'l See., Inc., 464 N.W.2d 760, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that under state law, a claim of fraud in the inducement is not arbitrable).
183. 464 N.W.2d 760 (1991). The dispute in Fouquette arose out of a securities purchase
agreement in which the parties ageed to submit any controversies to arbitration "unless
unenforceable due to state or federal law." Id. at 761.
184. Fouquette v. First Am. Nat'l See., Inc., 464 N.W.2d 760, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
For discussion of the Supreme Court's Prima Paint decision, see supra notes 126-144 and
accompanying text.
185. Fouquette, 464 N.W.2d at 762.
186. Id. The court nevertheless ordered arbitration of the fraud claims because the party sought
damages as his mode of relief. Id. at 763. Had the party's preferred remedy been rescission, the
court would have held that the proper forum should be judicial because the Minnesota court, unlike
the United States Supreme Court, contends that allegations of fraud vitiate the entire contract,
including the arbitration clause. Id. at 762-63.
187. Id.
188. Michael-Curry Companies, Inc. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 449 N.W.2d
139, 142 (Minn. 1989). "We are also concerned that parties often allege fraud in the inducement as a
final attempt to avoid arbitration. We therefore emphasize that, where a party applies for a stay of
arbitration, 'circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity.'" Id. at 143
(quoting Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 197 N.W.2d 448, 456 (Minn. 1972)).
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Does the Minnesota rule directly conflict with the Act? The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals did not think so.'8 9 "The FAA does not manifest a
policy preference for a certain set of procedural rules .... While the
FAA contains no express preemptive provision, federal law may preempt
state law [only] to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law."'19
This interpretation is true to the plain language of section 4 of the Act but
is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's view in Prima Paint.'9'
The key distinction may be that state courts are not bound by Prima Paint
because in Prima Paint, the matter was heard in federal court.
2. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
An issue that has remained untouched by the United States Supreme
Court is whether a party can waive an otherwise enforceable arbitration
agreement by performing acts inconsistent with that right. 192 In Donald
& Co. Securities., Inc. v. Mid-Florida Community Services, Inc., 93 a
Florida court of appeals held that the right to arbitration can be
waived.' 94 Mid-Florida initially "filed a complaint ... against the appel-
lants alleging a violation of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection
Act." 1 5 Thirteen months later, in order to compel arbitration, Mid-Flor-
ida served a motion to stay the proceedings it had earlier initiated.'9 In
response, the appellants contended that Mid-Florida had waived its right
to arbitration because it had initiated and participated in extensive litiga-
tion.' 97 The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court
order compelling arbitration and stated that "a party may waive arbitra-
tion by actively participating in a law suit or by taking action inconsistent
with that right."' 98
The holding in Donald & Co. Securities exemplifies a case in which a
party forfeits its right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that
right.' 99 Sections 3 and 4 of the Act provide that arbitration agreements
189. Fouquette, 464 N.W.2d at 762.
190. Id. at 762 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477-78
(1989)).
191. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
192. For example, a waiver might arise when a party files an action seeking to litigate a claim
and later attempts to invoke arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the contract.
193. 620 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
194. Donald & Co. Sec., Inc. v. Mid-Florida Community Serv., Inc., 620 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
195. Id. at 193.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 194. The Third District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
required a showing of prejudice to establish waiver. Id The Second District Court did not feel that
prejudice was a necessary element. Id. Since there was no federal law controlling on the issue, the
court applied the law of Florida. Id.
199. Donald & Co. Sec., 620 So. 2d at 194.
[Vol. 70:459
are to be specifically enforced. 2" However, section 4 provides that the
right to enforce a valid agreement to arbitrate is held by the party who is
aggrieved by another's failure to arbitrate.20 1 There is no indication in the
Act that the one who fails to arbitrate by initiating litigation can later
invoke the Act's protection. 2  Since the issue in Donald & Co. Securities
is limited to waiver, the holding should not be read as undermining the
substantive mandate of section 2, which requires the recognition of these
arbitration agreements. °3
3. Choice of Law Clauses
A significant number of states advocate the position that a choice of
law clause will not be preempted by the Act's procedural provisions. 2° A
separate issue, however, is whether a choice of law clause may operate to
preclude a party's right to arbitration entirely.20 5 If this were permitted,
federal substantive law would be displaced.
For example, consider the scenario in which parties incorporate a
choice of law clause in their arbitration agreement, and the applicable
state law requires bold print in the contract to alert parties that an arbitra-
tion clause is contained within the contract.2° Consider further that the
contract will be governed by the Act. Will the Act preempt state law if
the bold print requirement is not followed, rendering the arbitration
clause nevertheless enforceable?
The Missouri Court of Appeals held in Woermann Construction Co.
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 2 0 7 that when state procedural law
operates to deny arbitration entirely, the applicable state law is pre-
200. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1988).
201. id. § 4.
202. See supra note 42.
203. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Presumably, the other party to the action may file a motion to stay the
litigation as long as it has not acquiesced, thereby waiving its own right to compel arbitration. See
generally 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
204. See Albright v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 571 N.E.2d 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), cert.
denied, Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Carter, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992) (concluding that the arbitration clause
was not in compliance with the Missouri law chosen by the parties); American Physicians Serv.
Group, Inc. v. Port Lavaca Clinic Assoc., 843 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the
procedural provision in the Texas Arbitration Act prevailed over the Federal Arbitration Act because
parties chose Texas law); Madison Beauty Supply, Ltd. v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 481 N.W.2d 644, 648
Wis. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 490 N.W.2d24 (Wis. 1992) (stating that parties were entitled to
choose procedure for enforcing their agreement to arbitrate); Garden Grove Community Church v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that where the
parties agreed on the law of the construction site, its law governed the dispute, notwithstanding the
fact that the contracts involved interstate commerce).
205. But cf. Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (upholding a
choice-of-law clause consistent with the policies of the FAA).
206. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.460 (Vernon 1986) (requiring ten-point notice that the
contract contains a binding arbitration provision).
207. 846 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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empted by the Act.20 At issue in Woermann was the Missouri Arbitration
Act's requirement of a ten point capital letter notice stating "THIS CON-
TRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION
WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES." 20 9 The contract
between the parties did not contain this language.210 Consequently, Mis-
souri law rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable. 21 1 After a thor-
ough analysis regarding the commerce requirement of the Act, the
Missouri Court of Appeals found that the contract at issue was governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act.212 The court found that, whereas the
choice of law clause at issue in the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Volt2 13 had the effect of staying arbitration, the Missouri law operated
to deny arbitration entirely.21 4 Therefore, the court held that the Mis-
souri provision was preempted by the Act.215 The Woermann decision
provides a persuasive reason why Volt, which allowed a stay of arbitration,
should be construed only to apply to choice of law clauses addressing pre-
award proceedings, and not to situations in which state law displaces fed-
eral substantive law.2 16
VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Arbitration Act was adopted to sustain the validity and
enforcement of arbitration agreements.217 The outdated perception of
arbitration as an inferior means to resolve disputes has been superseded
by the Act and the United States Supreme Court decisions declaring the
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.218
Until Southland Corp. v. Keating,21 the Act's applicability to the
states was uncertain. After Keating, it became clear that the states are
bound by the Act's substantive provision. However, it is uncertain
whether the Act's procedural provisions are binding on the states as
208. Woermann Constr. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
209. Id. at 792.
210. Id. at 791-92.
211. Id. at 792.
212. Id. at 793 (finding that the commerce requirement had been fulfilled because, among other
reasons, the equipment used and the manufacturer were located outside of Missouri).
213. Volt Into. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
214. Woermann, 846 S.W.2d at 793.
215. Id.
216. "The great weight of lower court authority similarly rejects the notion that a choice-of-law
clause renders the FAA inapplicable. Choice-of-law clauses simply have never been used for the
purpose of dealing with the relationship between state and federal law." Volt, 489 U.S. at 489-90
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
218. See generally H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1924) and S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
219. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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well.120 The plain wording of the Act's procedural provisions, specifically
in sections 3 and 4, suggests that the Act does not stretch this far.22'
However, specific enforcement is the only remedy that will ensure an
aggrieved party the right to have arbitrable claims arbitrated.222 Hence,
although the section 3 and 4 procedural provisions, which require specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements, do not appear to be directly bind-
ing on the states, the Supreme Court has implied that specific enforce-
ment was the intended remedy in the event a party fails to honor the
agreement. 2z Therefore, a potential litigant in state court who is unsatis-
fied with his or her arbitration agreement will almost certainly be com-
pelled to arbitrate his or her claim.
A potential denial of arbitration exists when arbitrable and nonarbi-
trable issues are commingled. Thus, state courts should follow the Byrd
decision, despite the fact that it resulted from the application of section 4
of the Act and not section 2.224 Moreover, if the denial of a party's right
to arbitration in fact occurs, the court's decision denying arbitration would
likely be overturned on appeal because section 2 requires that courts
respect the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements. 2 25 It is
evident, therefore, that a statute or decision calling for the "doctrine of
intertwining" has implications for state courts beyond the section 4 proce-
dural requirement, for section 2 inevitably comes into play.
Choice of law clauses may be used to alter the procedural require-
ments of the Act as long as the substantive mandate of enforceability is
not infringed upon. However, choice of law clauses displacing the appli-
cability of the Act's substantive mandate will be invalid, as evidenced by
the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Woernann.26
The remaining issue concerning the Act and its effect on state court
proceedings is whether federal or state procedural law controls when a
contract is governed by the Act. There is no practical reason for the pre-
emption of state procedural law if it is generally consistent with the pur-
pose of the Act. State law should be upheld whether or not parties
incorporate a choice of law clause in their agreement because, just as state
220. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
221. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 & 4 (1988). See also supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
223. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1983).
224. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
225. Even if section 4 is inapplicable to state court proceedings, state law cannot displace the
section 2 validity provision. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (striking down a
provision of the California Franchise Investment Law because of its direct conflict with section 2 of
the Act).
226. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
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law cannot displace federal law where federal law controls, neither should
parties' choice of law clauses displace federal law." 7
It is clear now that any state law infringing on parties' valid arbitra-
tion agreements under the Act will be preempted.228 The proper solution
is to allow states to enforce their own procedural provisions as long as
section 2 of the Act is honored. This will reconcile the inapplicability of
the Act's procedural provisions while promoting the states' adherence to
the policies underlying the Act. In order to ensure state court autonomy,
only state procedural provisions and choice of law clauses that truly affect
the right to arbitration should be preempted. Consistent choice of law
clauses and consistent state procedural law should be placed on the same
footing.
Jon R. Schumacher
227. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 488 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that choice of law clauses are not designed to displace federal law).
228. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
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